Simplex and complex reflexives in French and Dutch

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1. Introduction[*]

We investigate the distinction between on the one hand simplex reflexives, more in particular *zich* in Dutch and *se* in French, and on the other hand the complex reflexives *zichzelf* and *se … lui-même*. First, we argue that such a (superficially discontinuous) complex reflexive exists in French. We then observe a series of sometimes rather subtle differences in interpretation between simplex and complex reflexives in contexts where both are possible. Current versions of the binding theory do not permit a statement of these intricacies of meaning. We suggest that viewing animate DPs as a collection of spatio-temporal stages or slices (Carlson 1977) allows an accurate formulation of the distributional and interpretive properties of simplex and complex anaphors. We develop a framework for Binding in which anaphors intersect in different ways with the sets of time-slices of their antecedents. A distributional difference between Dutch *zich* and French *se* concerns stative verbs: these are incompatible with *zich*, but not with *se*. We relate this difference to the availability of the syntax of inalienable possession with *se* but not with *zich*. The latter is in turn related to the fact that *se* is bimorphemic and contains a noun denoting a body-part (Pica 1995), whereas *zich* is monomorphemic and does not refer to a body-part. Independent confirmation for this claim comes from the domain of inalienable *have*-constructions.

2. The syntax of complex anaphors

Consider a simple reflexive context as in (1), and its French equivalent in (2).[1]

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[1] Approaches such as those defended by Reinhart & Reuland (1993) and Lidz (1997) assume that the verb in (1) is lexically reflexive with the simplex anaphor, and transitive otherwise. However, the appeal to the notion of 'lexical reflexivity' obfuscates the systematic nature of the phenomenon at issue: it turns out that simplex and complex anaphors reveal a systematic semantic difference, which is rather subtle in the examples in (1), but which can be brought to the fore by looking at the appropriate contexts (cf. below).

(1)   a.   Sally heeft zich(zelf) gewassen.
            'Sally washed herself'
       b.   Jan zal zich(zelf) verdedigen.
            'Jan will defend himself'
(2)   a.   Sally s'est lavée (elle-même).
       b.   Jean se défendra (lui-même).

Syntactically, the French data reveal both a similarity and a difference with the Dutch facts: the clitic reflexive *se* corresponds to the clitic reflexive *zich* (see Jaspers 1989 on the clitic nature of *zich*); to this simplex reflexive clitic can be added a *self* element to form a complex reflexive both in French and in Dutch. The latter is *zelf* in Dutch, while in French it consists of a combination of an agreeing pronoun and the element *même*. The *self* element occurs independently of reflexive constructions as a focus marker in different positions.

(3)   a.   Jan (zelf) heeft (zelf) de afwas gedaan.
       b.   Jean (lui-même) a fait la vaisselle (lui-même).
            'Jan (himself) did the dishes (himself).'

Let us assume that the focus marker, i.e. both *zelf* and *lui-même*, when they do not occur adjacent to the subject, occupy a VP-adjoined position. Semantically, this VP-adjoined interpretation can be recognised through being paraphraseable as follows: *by himself, without the help of others* (at least with agentive verbs; cf. below). We further analyse the Dutch focus marker *zelf* as a combination of an empty pronoun *pro* and *zelf*, so as to bring it in full structural agreement with its French and English counterparts, which feature a lexical pronoun. Schematically, the analysis of the complex anaphor as a combination of the simplex SE anaphor and a focus marker can be represented as in (4).

(4)   a. DP_i … [[zich] [pro_i zelf]]
       b. DP_i … [[se] [lui_i-même]]

The complex anaphor itself occupies an argument position, mostly the internal argument of a transitive verb. Particularly with respect to French, this analysis might raise some eyebrows, as *se* necessarily raises to the V°-T° complex and (4b) never actually surfaces as such. One might consequently be led to believe that *lui-même* such as it is found in (2) is actually identical to the one in (3), i.e. a VP-adjoined adjunct.

However, the analysis of complex anaphors in (4) suggests that *lui-même* occupies an argument position, modulo raising of *se* to T. The distribution of *lui-même* in reflexive environments indeed suggests that *lui-même* can occupy an argument position there. A first argument comes from apparent clitic doubling constructions. Reflexive sentences involving dative *se* can double the dative argument with a complex anaphor, as in (5a). The sentence (5b) shows that this possibility is not available outside of reflexive contexts in French (unless right dislocation is involved, which involves a clear comma intonation).[2]

(5)   a.   Elle s'est offert un livre à elle-même.
            'She gave herself a book.'
       b.   *Elle lui a offert un livre à Marie.
            'She gave her a book to Marie.'

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[2]   It should also be observed that this doubling is restricted to dative arguments, i.e. arguments that allow for cliticization by dative clitics.

We would like to explain these otherwise puzzling facts with reference to the configuration in (4) above. This means that *se* originates inside the dative argument *à lui-même* before it moves to T°. Such an analysis is made more plausible by the fact that dative *à* has often been argued to be a case-marker rather than a preposition: as such, it is not likely to block movement of *se* out of the dative argument.

Another argument comes from the interpretation: in certain contexts, it is clear that the VP-adjoined interpretation *by himself, without the help of others* is excluded:

(6)   Max se considérait lui-même comme le meilleur candidat.
        'Max considered himself the best candidate.'

Further interpretive evidence comes from a comparison of *lui-même* with uncontroversial VP-adjuncts, such as *intentionnellement* 'intentionally'. Consider a verb like *se blesser* 'to hurt oneself', which can have a nonvolitional reading without *lui-même* (see (7a)), and a volitional reading with *lui-même* (see (7b)):

(7)   a. Freddy s'est blessé.   [-volitional]
            'Freddy hurt himself.'
        b. Freddy s'est blessé lui-même.   [+volitional]
            'Freddy hurt himself.'
        c. Freddy s'est blessé intentionnellement. [+volitional]
            'Freddy hurt himself on purpose.'

Below (see (23)), we analyse (7a) as a case involving an unaccusative argument frame, i.e. the surface subject is an underlying internal argument; this accounts for the nonagentive interpretation of (7a). By contrast, (7b) is analysed as a transitive configuration, with *lui-même* occupying the direct object position; this configuration is responsible for the agentive interpretation of (7b). The agentive interpretation in (7c), however, derives from the addition of the agentive adjunct *intentionnellement* 'on purpose' to an unaccusative (i.e. nonagentive) verb. Since adjuncts are apparently able of making a nonagentive verb agentive, one could suggest that *lui-même* is capable of doing the same thing: under such an analysis, (7b) would involve the unaccusative structure, augmented with VP-adjoined *lui-même*. One then expects the VP-adjoined *lui-même* to be able to perform the same function with respect to other [-volitional] subjects. This is not the case: in the context of nonagentive verbs, *lui-même* contributes an interpretation that is distinct from the one found with agentive verbs (i.e. *by himself, without the help of others*), but that is also clearly distinct from the one found with *intentionnellement* 'on purpose'. Instead, *lui-même* with nonagentive verbs signals exclusion, e.g. 'Freddy, and no-one else', as in (8a) below.

(8)   a. Freddy est tombé lui-même/intentionnellement.
            'Freddy fell himself/on purpose.'
        b. Contre toute attente, il s'est évanoui lui-même/intentionnellement.
            'Against expectations, he fainted himself/on purpose.'

In (8b), the same exclusion reading is found. No agentive reading similar to that of (7b) is possible. As the sentence contains a verb that does not occur in a transitive argument frame, *lui-même* can only be interpreted as an adjunct (just as in (8a)). The fact that the interpretation of *lui-même* is so different in (7b) (intention) and (8b) (exclusion) is accounted for by the present analysis, which takes *lui-même* in (7b) to occupy the internal argument position of a transitive verb, and not the adjunct position of a focus marker.

For Dutch, similar arguments can be given; for one thing, there is an intonational difference between the argumental complex anaphor as in (1a), and the combination of a

simplex anaphor and a focus marker. Consider the verb *wassen* 'to wash (oneself)', which, as (1) has shown, can be used both with the simplex anaphor *zich* and the complex one *zichzelf*. In the former use, the subject can be accompanied by the VP-adjoined focus marker *zelf*, which gives rise to a surface string that is identical to the one found with the complex anaphor.

(9)   a.   Ze heeft zichzelf geWASsen.
          'She washed herself.'
      b.   Ze heeft zich ZELF gewassen.
          'She washed herself.'

Intonationally and semantically, however, the two sentences are different: (9a) has a main accent on the verb (indicated by small caps), whereas (9b) has main accent on the focus marker *zelf* and a secondary accent on the verb. Semantically, (9b) displays the interpretation found with VP-adjoined *self* (i.e. *by herself, without the help of others*), whereas (9a) does not. Verbs that cannot be used transitively, such as *zich vergissen* 'to make a mistake', can only have one intonation contour.

(10) a.   Ze heeft zich ZELF vergist.
          'She made a mistake herself.'
      b.   *Ze heeft zichzelf verGIST.
          'She mistook herself.'
(11) a.   Hij schaamde zich ZELF.
          'He was ashamed himself.'
      b.   *Hij SCHAAMde zichzelf.
          'He shamed himself.'

Suppose that, in spite of the intonational evidence, *zelf* were taken to be an adjunct in a case like (9a): we would then be at a loss to explain why it could not have the intonation pattern of (9a) precisely in those cases where a transitive analysis is ruled out for independent reasons, i.e. in the cases of (10) and (11). We conclude that the different intonation patterns do indeed correlate with different syntactic structures.

3.   Duplication

Mme Tussaud or 'Doppelgänger' contexts (Fauconnier 1985, Jackendoff 1992, Lidz 1997) involve the following paradox: an individual is viewed as one and the same in one sense, and yet at the same time different in another. For example, in a sentence such as (12), where Ringo Starr meets (a statue of) himself at Mme Tussaud's, the anaphor and its antecedent are viewed as referring to the same individual, and at the same time as referring to spatio-temporally different entities.

(12)   Ringo Starr nearly fell on himself at Mme Tussaud's.

Mme Tussaud or 'Doppelgänger' environments are sensitive to the distinction between simplex and complex anaphors, in that only complex anaphors seem capable of occurring in a 'Doppelgänger' context. For example, the sentence in (13a) below, where only *zichzelf* is appropriate, should be understood against a 'Doppelgänger' background in which Sally and Freddy went to the masquerade as literal cross-dressers: Sally dressed as Freddy, and Freddy as Sally. Similarly in (13b), *zichzelf* is required in Oscar Wilde's story where

Dorian Gray is confronted with his real depraved self, so different from his apparent youthful self. [3]

(13) a. Op het *bal masqué* konden Sally en Freddy zichzelf/*zich zien zonder spiegel.
'At the masquerade, Sally and Freddy could see themselves without a mirror.'
b. Dorian Gray zag zichzelf/*zich op het schilderij zoals hij eruit gezien zou moeten hebben.
'Dorian Gray saw himself on the picture the way he should have looked.'

Turning to French, we find an analogous situation, in that the complex anaphor is preferred in Madame Tussaud contexts.

(14) a. Au bal masqué, Freddy et Sally pouvaient se voir *?(eux-mêmes) sans miroir.
b. Dorian Gray se voyait *?(lui-même) dans la peinture tel qu'il aurait dû être.

The 'Doppelgänger' or 'duplication' effect is prominent in contexts where a spatio-temporal distance is introduced. Thus in (15a) below, viewing oneself in the mirror involves simultaneity between viewer and viewee, and both *se* and *se …lui-même* are possible; (15a) also shows that the impossibility of *zich* in (13) is not due to anything syntactic, as the syntactic environments are identical. The sentence (15a) contrasts with (15b), where the video-recording context forces a temporal distance between observer and observed, resulting in a marked degradation of the use of the simplex anaphor for most speakers.[4] In (16a), the use of the simplex anaphor involves simultaneity: Sally is monitoring her own speech through headphones. The use of the complex anaphor involves nonsimultaneity, whereby Sally is separated into two spatio-temporal entities: she hears her own voice on the radio, in a dream, or she does not control her speech under the influence of drugs. In the example (16b), the simplex anaphor involves a context in which Max is going through a near-death experience. The use of the complex anaphor involves a theatre experience in which Max sees an actor impersonating him who is dying on stage.

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[3]   The judgments in the examples (13) through (16) should be taken as comparative: the markings do not indicate that either the simplex or the complex anaphor are ever completely ruled out, but rather that one is (possibly strongly) preferred over the other.

[4]   The choice of tense has an influence on the acceptability of the simplex anaphor in contexts involving dissociation. In both French and Dutch, the counterpart of (15b) is markedly better if a perfective tense is used:

i.   Freddy heeft zich op de video gezien.
Freddy s'est vu sur la bande vidéo.
'Freddy has seen himself on the video.'

Similar observations obtain for most other cases of dissociation. While we have no explanation for these facts, we are not surprised to find interference between SE-reflexives and tense under our analysis, which analyses *zich* and *se* as referring to time-slices.

(15) a. Freddy zag zichzelf/zich in de spiegel.
          Freddy se voyait (lui-même) dans le miroir.
          'Freddy saw himself in the mirror.'
      b. Freddy zag zichzelf/*?zich op de video-opname.
          Freddy se voyait *?(lui-même) sur la bande vidéo.
          'Freddy saw himself in the video recording.'
(16) a. Sally hoorde zich(zelf) praten.
          Sally s'entendait parler (elle-même).
          'Sally heard herself talk.'
      b. Max zag zich(zelf) doodgaan.
          Max se voyait mourir (lui-même).
          'Max saw himself die.'

These observations lead to the following descriptive generalisation:

(17)   The complex anaphor is required whenever a predicate allows for the interpretation
        of the antecedent as a 'duplicated', i.e. a spatio-temporally different entity.

Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd (1998) argue that such contexts require an account of
reflexivity that goes beyond what is traditionally assumed in the Binding Theory (see also
Zribi-Hertz 1980:133). Concretely, we suggest that the simplex anaphor *zich* establishes a
relation of identity between a stage (in the sense of Carlson 1977) of the subject, and a stage
of the (dynamic) activity expressed by the verb. The complex anaphor *zichzelf*, on the other
hand, is analysed as a combination of *zich* and the Focus marker *zelf*, which occurs
independently of *zich*. If *zich* represents a simultaneous time-slice of its animate antecedent,
zichzelf involves identification with a set of time-slices of the antecedent. This type of
temporal identification derives the 'duplication' effects described in terms of spatial or
temporal dissociation in Mme Tussaud contexts. In the following section, we shall elaborate
on this analysis.

4.   Identity as sliceability

The facts briefly reviewed above suggest the need for two distinct notions of identity: one
involves simultaneity, another spatio-temporal dissociation. This distinction cannot be
captured by the traditional binding theory, which views identity as a matter of coindexing, or,
possibly, coreference, i.e. distinctly indexed DPs referring to the same object in the 'real
world' (Reinhart 1983). However, the distinction between binding and coreference does not
allow us to make the required contrasts, since it only affords a view in terms of identity or
absence thereof. An alternative view on (co)reference and anaphoric binding is therefore
required, within which an interpretation of the type 'same, but nevertheless (spatio-
temporally) different' can be formally expressed.

        Our central claim concerning the simplex anaphor is that it involves identity of
stages, whereas complex anaphors do not require this. The distinction between a stage and
an individual is well-known from the philosophical and linguistic literature (cf. Goodman
1951, Quine 1960, Carlson 1977, Hinrichs 1985). Under this conception, individuals are to
be viewed as spatio-temporal regions or 'sausages', composed of stages or time-slices. For
instance, in the Carlsonian ontology, there are three categories: individuals, stages, and
kinds. We propose a modification of this ontology along the following lines: we postulate a
distinction between animate DPs, which we claim possess stages, and inanimate DPs, which

are not composed of stages.[5] The distinction shows up in many domains of the grammar. As far as reflexives are concerned, Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd (1998) observe that *zich* makes a distinction between animate and inanimate DPs: *zich* is always compatible with animate DPs, but not with inanimates. When one looks at the latter category in detail, two categories of inanimate DPs can in fact be distinguished: one includes 'lower' inanimates, such as stones, knives, glasses, tables, and the like. Since we argue that *zich* establishes identity between slices, DPs not possessing slices, such as the lower inanimates just mentioned, are incompatible with *zich*. By contrast, inanimates of a 'higher order' are possible with *zich*; these include meteorological phenomena (e.g. storms, hurricanes, the weather, etc.), objects of internal technological complexity and/or autonomous movement (e.g. cars, aeroplanes, computers), etc. The contrast between both categories is illustrated in the following example:

(18) a. *Het glas verplaatste zich over de tafel.
           'The glass moved across the table.'
      b. Morgen verplaatst de storm zich naar het oosten van het land.
           'Tomorrow, the storm will move to the east of the country.'

The 'higher order' inanimates, such as storms, are treated as if they were true animates, the relevant property being that they contain stages. Stages being spatio-temporally bounded episodes, they carry with them the notion of temporal progression or change; by contrast, absence of stages implies absence of temporal progression. The notion of temporal progression or change warrants some further discussion. First, there is the distinction between internal and external change. Suppose I accidentally hit the table, and as a result the glass on it moved a few inches. In such a context, (18a) would be impossible. But if the glass were seen to move autonomously, as in a fairy-tale context or through some unexplained magic, (18a) would become perfectly acceptable. French facts similar to those of (18) are discussed in Labelle (1992), who likewise makes a distinction between internal and external change. Internally driven change is necessary for an entity to be viewed as animate, i.e. possessing stages. Then, there is the notion of progression or change itself. Essential to this is the idea that the change at issue leaves some essence of the entity involved unaffected. Thus living things typically show significant change over time (e.g. they may age, grow beards, change opinions from one day to the next, etc.), and still remain the same individual. The same is true for the 'higher order' animates just discussed, which, in this sense as well, then, are viewed as if they were living things.

Since the parameter we suggest in fact cross-cuts the animate-inanimate distinction we propose to rename it as follows: we shall call DPs showing internal temporal progression *sliceable*, since they must be semantically represented as a set of time-slices. DPs not showing internal temporal progression are *nonsliceable*: they lack a semantic representation in terms of time-slices. Returning to our modification of the Carlsonian ontology, we shall say that the grammar makes a distinction between DPs which are sliceable and those which are nonsliceable. A further point on which we differ from Carlson is that we assume that configuration determines interpretation. That is, the membership of any given DP to the class of sliceable or nonsliceable entities is not fixed, but determined by the syntactic context. The discussion of (18a) in the previous paragraph revealed that there is in fact an interpretation for this example which involves a shift to the class of sliceable DPs. This phenomenon is pervasive: on the one hand, DPs which would normally be considered inanimate may be taken to be sliceable, and on the other hand animate DPs may be treated as nonsliceable, i.e. as lacking internal temporal progression. Consider the following well-known contrast:

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[5]   The terminology animate-inanimate to refer to the distinction is not entirely accurate, and we shall modify it later on, but it will do for present purposes.

(19) a. Max is drunk.
      b. Max is intelligent.

Although in both cases the same individual, Max, is involved, this individual is treated differently by the grammar: in (19a) Max is seen as showing internal temporal progression.[6] Although Max is drunk at the present moment, this is merely a transient state of Max, not a permanent property. As Hoekstra (1992:159) suggests, individual-level predicates may be said to be atemporal: they hold of the entire individual, not of some temporally bounded slice of it. Put differently, they are unable to predicate over spatio-temporal stages of a DP. As a result, in (19b) *Max* is treated as if he were nonsliceable, showing no internal temporal progression and not being temporally bounded either (although he is spatially bounded).

The effect of the configuration on the interpretation may go from predicate to subject, as in (19), but also the other way round, i.e. from subject to predicate. Observe that the notion of temporal progression or dynamism is also one that applies to verbs, where it is usually perceived as an aspectual category. We suggest that is no coincidence that individual-level predicates are all states: both the subject and the predicate lack sliceability.[7] Now depending on whether a subject has or lacks sliceability, a verb may be interpreted as dynamic or stative (Hoekstra 1991):

(20) a. Marc prétend que la France gagnera la coupe du monde.
          'Marc claims that France will win the world cup.'
      b. L'article prétend que la France gagnera la coupe du monde.
          'The article claims that France will win the world cup.'

In (20a), the subject is sliceable, and the verb is dynamic, i.e. both the subject and the predicate have internal temporal progression. Various linguistic operations affecting temporal parameters can be performed on the verb in (20a): it can be put in the perfect (*passé composé*), *passé simple*, and future tenses, the activity may be presented as ongoing by using a progressive-like tense (i.e. *Marc est en train de prétendre que*), etc. By contrast, (20b) allows none of these manipulations of the temporal structure, the predicate in effect being interpreted as a state. Neither the subject nor the predicate show any sign of internal temporal progression or boundedness. The following well-known contrast, due to Oehrle (1976), can be analysed along similar lines.

(21) a. Nixon (just) gave Mailer a book.
      b. Nixon (*just) gave Mailer a book.
      c. The book (*just) gave Nixon an ulcer.

In (21a), the subject *Nixon* is an animate (i.e. sliceable) Agent, and the activity is seen as involving a literal transfer. In (21b), the subject is not an Agent but a Cause: it is something about Nixon that gives Mailer the idea for a book. We take the Cause interpretation not to be due to the fact that the verb *give* has two different argument frames, but instead attribute the Cause interpretation to the independently observed fact that animate DPs may be treated as nonsliceable (as is the case with the Cause in (21c)). This is confirmed by the fact that

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[6]   The grammatical relevance of the distinction is revealed in the well-known case of *there* sentences (Milsark 1977, Carlson 1977).

[7]   The identification of (verbal) dynamism with sliceability, though conceptually attractive, is empircially not quite complete. Thus the class of stage-level predicates includes states (such as be drunk in (19a)): these apply to a stage or slice of the subject, but lack dynamism. Disregarding these, we could say that the parameters [sliceable], which applies to nominals, and [dynamic], which applies to verbs, are variant instantiations of the same distinction. We leave this problem as a matter for future research.

the interpretation of the predicate likewise changes, in a manner which is reminiscent of the stativisation that takes place in (20b): no literal transfer is involved in (21b) and (21c). Psychological verbs show a similar ambiguity between an interpretation as an Agent or as a Cause (Ruwet 1972).

(22) a. Cette histoire m'amuse.
          'I find this story amusing.'
      b. Jean m'amuse.
          'I find Jean amusing.'
          'Jean is amusing me.'

In (22a) the subject is a Cause, whereas in (22b) it can either be a Cause or an Agent. The verb is stative if the subject is taken to be a Cause, dynamic otherwise. Again, the presence of the temporal dimension, both in respect to the subject and the verb, distinguishes these two situations.

      The examples in (20) through (22) reveal an intimate connection between the temporal interpretation of the subject and that of the predicate. Objects do not display this intimate link, i.e. we know of no cases where the interpretation of the verb shifts from nonstative to stative depending on the sliceability of the object. We assume that this difference is due to a property of subject-verb agreement, notably the feature [person]: the latter, we assume, is the morpho-syntactic instantiation of the concept of sliceability. Subject positions are syntactically characterised by the feature [person] in AGR-S/T, absent in e.g. AGR-O. Hoekstra (in prep.) and Rooryck (1997) argue that only animate DPs possess a [person] feature. The apparent [3p] agreement of inanimate NPs is in fact default agreement triggered by the absence of [person]. Semantically, the feature [person] realises the set of (animate) T-slices, informally represented as {t1...t2...tn}. As far as the syntax of simplex SE anaphors is concerned, we follow Everaert (1986) and Kayne (1988), who take Dutch *zich* and Romance *se/si*, respectively, to be clitic heads in an unaccusative configuration. We further propose that SE morphologically marks a relation of identity between a time-slice of a sliceable DP in SpecAGR-S/TP, and a time-slice of the event expressed in V. Schematically, reflexive SE is represented as in (23b), where the index tSE should not be taken as an anaphoric index, but as an indication of the checking of simultaneity. For ease of comparison, (23a) gives the structure for a transitive environment with a complex anaphor:

(23) a. $[_{TP}$ NP_i T°-SE $[_{VP}$ V   lui-même$_i$]]
      b. $[_{TP}$ NP_i T°-SE $[_{VP}$ V t_i]]
                    | |
          {t1...t2...tSE...tn} {t1...t2...tSE...tn}

These assumptions allow us to derive the difference between stative and dynamic interpretations in the above sets of examples. The T-slices of a sliceable subject DP can be checked by the feature [person] in AGR$_S$/T, but not those of a nonsliceable DP. Through checking, the T-slice of an animate DP that is simultaneous with sentential T 'hooks up' with that sentential T, allowing for dynamic tense, and for the interpretation of the subject as an Agent at the interface as in (20a) and (21a). In the absence of such checking, T cannot be made dynamic, and the predicate is stativised, resulting in an interpretation of the subject as a Cause (as in (20b), (21bc), and (22a)). Thematic notions such as Agent and Cause are thus seen to derive to some extent from the analysis of the notion person in terms of T-slices.

      This approach applies to the difference between simplex and complex anaphors as follows. We assume that anaphoric identity operates over (animate) T-slices, thus allowing

for several forms of identity. Simplex anaphors, being clitics in T°, represent a simultaneous time-slice of their sliceable antecedent, while complex anaphors involve a more encompassing identification, i.e. with a set of time-slices of the antecedent. The latter type of temporal identification, paired with the transitive structure (23a), derives the 'duplication' effects described in terms of spatial or temporal dissociation.

An argument in favour of the unaccusative analysis comes from the behaviour with respect to negation. Consider the well-known Russellian barber's paradox:

(24) a. Le barbier rase tout le monde qui ne se rase pas *(lui-même).
     b. De barbier scheert iedereen die zich*(zelf) niet scheert.
        'The barber shaves everyone who doesn't shave himself.'

In this context, only the complex anaphor is possible (Ter Meulen 1998). This fact can be derived from the behaviour of transitive verbs with respect to negation.

(25) a. Jean-Pierre n'a pas téléphoné.
        'Jean-Pierre did not telephone.'
     b. Jean-Pierre n'a pas téléphoné à Marianne/à cinq heures.
        'Jean-Pierre did not telephone Marie/at five o' clock.'

With an intransitive verb (25a), use of the negation implies that the subject did not engage in the activity of making telephone calls; while such calls may have been made, it was not Jean-Pierre who did. As soon as an object or adjunct is added, however, the interpretation may shift: in (25b), Jean-Pierre may have been making telephone calls alright, but he did not make them to Marianne, or he did not make them at five o'clock (under yet another reading, Marianne may have received a call, but not from Jean-Pierre). Now consider the following:

(26) a. Jean-Pierre ne se rase pas.
        'Jean-Pierre does not shave.'
     b. Jean-Pierre ne se rase pas lui-même.
        'Jean-Pierre does not shave himself.'

In (26b) we find a situation analogous to (25b): shaving of Jean-Pierre (Patient) goes on allright, but it is not Jean-Pierre (Agent) who does it. This is the kind of situation required by the barber's paradox sentence (24): a duplication of one person in two roles, Agent and Patient, with the negation bearing on only one of those two roles. This situation contrasts with (26a), where the implication is that Jean-Pierre has a beard: no shaving goes on at all. Since this type of interpretation is also found in (25a), the view is confirmed that we are dealing with an mono-argumental, i.e. unaccusative, verb.

Further evidence for the status of SE as an unaccusative head comes from impersonals such as (27) in French:

(27) a. Il s'est lavé plusieurs personnes ici.
        'Several persons were washed here'
        'Several persons washed themselves here.'
     b. Plusieurs personnes se sont lavés ici.
        'Several persons washed themselves here'

The sentence (27a) can not only be interpreted as an impersonal passive (first translation), but also as an impersonal reflexive, parallel to (27b); the position of the subject in (27a) is normally restricted to underlying objects, which confirms an unaccusative source for the reflexive readings of (27).

Finally, the unaccusative analysis of reflexive SE receives support from the decreased agentivity of the subject in these contexts:

(28) a.   Freddy sneed zich.   [-volitional]
               'Freddy cut himself.'
      b.   Freddy sneed zichzelf.   [+volitional]
               'Freddy cut himself'
(29) a.   Freddy s'est blessé.   [-volitional]
               'Freddy hurt himself.'
      b.   Freddy s'est blessé lui-même.   [+volitional]
               'Freddy hurt himself.'

Internal arguments necessarily receive a nonagentive (nonvolitional) interpretation, whereas external arguments of transitive VPs can be interpreted as agentive. The difference postulated between the unaccusative configuration of predicates with simplex reflexives ((28a) and (29a)), and the transitive configuration of complex reflexives ((28b) and (29b)), accounts for the agentivity differences observed between them.

The unaccusative analysis also has implications for so-called 'inherent' reflexives, which never show up without their reflexive marker such as *(zich) schamen* 'be ashamed, *(zich) vergissen* 'be mistaken', *(s)'évanouir* 'to faint', *(se) dépêcher* 'to hurry'. Interestingly, these predicates always feature animate subjects in all of the languages we have been able to survey. They also involve a nonvolitional but nevertheless somewhat agentive, i.e. conscious, subject. We submit that these predicates are the result of a syntactic operation, and are not simply listed in the lexicon. As T. Hoekstra (p.c.) points out, the absence of *zich* in nominalisations (e.g. *de zich-schaamte* 'the self-shame') supports this point of view.

The analysis developed allows an account of the intricate set of properties of psychological verbs. Above, we observed shift between stative and dynamic readings with psychological verbs (see (22) above): they can be stative, in which case the subject is a Cause and the object an Experiencer, or dynamic, in which case the thematic frame is one of Agent-Theme. But the facts are more complicated than that, as becomes clear on considering the examples of reflexively used psych-verbs in (30).

(30) a.   Albert s'amuse bien dans son nouvel emploi.
               'Albert is having fun in his new job.'
      b.   Nathan s'ennuie pas mal à ce poste.
               'Nathan is bored in this position.'

Thematically, the subject in these examples is not an Agent; it would be most accurately described as an Experiencer, i.e. one undergoing a particular emotion. This observation can be accounted for by assuming that the subject in (30) is an underlying object, bearer of the Experiencer role, i.e. reflexive psych-verbs are unaccusative. Yet there is another property of (30) that is remarkable. It seems attractive to somehow relate the unaccusative verb to the Cause-Experiencer verb, possibly through some manipulation on its argument frame. However, the unaccusative verb sharply diverges from the Cause-Experiencer verb in terms of dynamism: whereas the latter is stative, the sentences in (30) are nonstative, as can be gathered from their occurrence in progressive environments:

(31) a. Albert est en train de s'amuser.
          'Albert is having fun.'
      b. Nathan est en train de s'ennuyer.
          'Nathan is being bored.'

If we put Cause-Experiencer verbs in this context, they immediately shift to an Agent-Theme interpretation:

(32)   Albert est en train de m'amuser.

In contrast to (31), (32) necessarily has an Agent-Theme interpretation. This complex of intricate properties of (reflexive) psych-verbs follows from our analysis. Since SE expresses a temporal slice, reflexive sentences with the simplex anaphor are necessarily dynamic. Their further thematic properties follow from the assumption that they have an unaccusative argument frame.

As a final point in this section, consider the question why *zich* is needed: sliceable subjects are perfectly happy to live with dynamic predicates when *zich* is not present, and arguably some languages (e.g. English) do not possess anything like *zich*. So why does *zich* arise in certain contexts to mark temporal dynamism, but not in others? Let us take a look at objects again: we already stated that object positions do not show the same correlation in terms of sliceability with the activity of the verb that subjects do. A special case is that of underlying objects, which could, in principle, enter into a special relation with the verb through activation of their person feature after moving into the subject position. This is in fact what we have argued happens in the case of simplex anaphors. But clearly this is not the only option: a passive subject, for example, may be inanimate or nonsliceable but co-occur with a dynamic verb, and the same holds true for many unaccusative subjects without SE. This suggests the following conclusions: in passive and nonreflexive unaccusative structures, the [person] feature in AGR-S/T may be deactivated or absent. In view of our assumptions on the feature [person] (cf. supra), this does not appear as an unnatural move. By contrast, SE unaccusatives permit (in fact, require) an interpretation of a derived subject as dynamic or sliceable. In a way, SE 'opens up' the time slices of the internal argument DP which is moved to subject position, thereby construing the potential for an agentive interpretation. Reflexive subjects consequently display a unique combination of properties of internal and external arguments: thematically, they typically bear a nonagentive role, but in virtue of the dynamism imposed on them by SE, they take on secondary agentive properties. Empirically speaking this seems to be exactly what is required.

5.   Simplex anaphors in stative contexts

The analysis of simplex anaphors as representing a time-slice of the antecedent predicts that simplex anaphors should be incompatible with verbs not possessing internal temporal progression. These include the class of individual-level predicates, which are all stative, as well as the wider class of stative verbs generally. This prediction is confirmed: in Dutch, *zich* is incompatible with stative verbs, including individual level predicates:

(33) a. Freddy vindt zichzelf/*zich fantastisch.
   'Freddy considers himself fantastic.'
  b. Freddy kent zichzelf/*zich niet.
   'Freddy does not know himself.'
  c. Suzy haat/apprecieert zichzelf/*zich.
   'Suzy hates/appreciates herself.'

However, once we turn to French, the facts seem to be slightly more complicated. Thus Pica & Snyder (1997) note the following contrast in French:

(34) a. ??Louis s'apprécie.
  b. Louis s'apprécie beaucoup.
   'Louis appreciates himself (a great deal).'
(35) a. ??Mathilde s'aime.
  b. Mathilde s'aime bien.
   'Mathilde likes herself (well).'
(36) a. ??Jean se connaît.
  b. Jean se connaît bien.
   'Jean knows himself (well).'

The reflexive verbs in these examples are systematically improved by the addition of an adverb indicating degree. This observation does not carry over to Dutch, where the addition of a degree adverb does not improve sentences with stative verbs.

(37) a. Mathilde hield (veel) van *zich/zichzelf.
   'Mathilde liked herself (a lot).'
  b. Jean kent *zich/zichzelf (goed).
   'Jean knows himself (well).'

Instead, the complex reflexive must be used. In the latter respect, there is no difference between Dutch and French, i.e. the French examples with a complex reflexive are good regardless of the presence of an adverb.

(38) a. Mathilde s'aimait (beaucoup) elle-même.
   'Mathilde loved herself.'
  b. Jean se connaît (bien) lui-même.
   'Jean knows himself.'

In view of our analysis of *zich* and *se* in essentially the same configurational (unaccusative) and semantic (time-slice) terms, this contrast between Dutch and French is unexpected. In this section, we would like to investigate the reasons behind this state of affairs, to find out how the facts can be reconciled with the theory sketched so far. First of all, it is interesting to observe that the sentences noted above for French possess temporal characteristics that set them apart from other reflexives. When the relevant sentences are used in a compound tense indicating perfective aspect, they are sharply ungrammatical:

(39) a. *Après un traitement psychiatrique prolongé, Louis s'est (beaucoup) apprécié.
           'After prolonged psychiatric treatment, Louis appreciated himself (a great deal).'
      b. *Mathilde s'est (bien) aimée.
           'Mathilde liked herself (well).'
      c. *Jean s'est (bien) connu, mais maintenant ce n'est plus le cas.
           'Jean knew himself (well), but that's no longer the case.'

Again we find that this restriction does not hold with complex reflexives, i.e. the sentences improve through the addition of *lui-même* 'himself'.

(40) a. Après un traitement psychiatrique prolongé, Louis s'est finalement
           apprécié *(lui-même).
           'After prolonged psychiatric treatment, Louis finally appreciated himself.'
      b. Mathilde s'est longtemps aimée *(elle-même).
           'Mathilde liked herself for the longest time'
      c. Jean s'est toujours connu *(lui-même), mais maintenant ce n'est plus le cas.
           'Jean always knew himself, but that's no longer the case'

The cases with the complex anaphors can be analysed as instances of the transitive structure in (23a), both in French and in Dutch (cf. also section 6). The problematic case concerns the simplex anaphors, which display the following peculiar properties: the temporal inertness observed in (39), and the obligatory presence of the modifying adverb in (34) through (36). Needless to say, 'standard' reflexive constructions do not exhibit either temporal or adverbial restrictions:

(41) a. Sophie se lave (bien).
           'Sophie washes herself (well).'
      b. Sophie s'est (bien) lavée.
           'Sophie has washed herself (well).'

It seems to us that the temporally and adverbially restricted reflexives can advantageously be analogised to contexts involving inalienable possession.

(42) a. Jean a un *(grand) nez.
           'Jean has a (big) nose.'
      b. Jean avait/ *a eu un grand nez.
           'John has had a big nose.'

In these sentences, the characteristics of obligatory modification and temporal inertness observed for the French sentences in (34)-(36) and (39) seem to hold.[8] The same is true to a large extent for the Dutch and French constructions in (43) and (44), which are identical to (42), except that they may be said to involve 'abstract' body parts:[9]

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[8]   Perfective aspect improves in inalienable contexts when a temporal contrast is introduced. This is the case both for concrete and abstract inalienable constructions:

i.   Jan heeft altijd een grote neus gehad, maar de plastisch chirurg heeft daar wat aan veranderd.
          'Jan has always had a big nose, but the plastic surgeon changed it.'

ii.   Jan heeft altijd een hoge dunk van zichzelf gehad, maar nu zingt hij wel een toontje lager.
          'Jan has always held in high esteem, but now he has changed his tune.'

[9]   The case in (44a) does not involve a compound and does not seem to trigger inalienable effects to the same extent. We will not investigate it further here.

(43) a. Louis heeft een *(hoge) dunk van zichzelf (*gehad).
      'Louis holds/ has held himself in (high) esteem.'
  b. Mathilde heeft *(veel) eigenliefde (*gehad).
      'Mathilde has (had) (a lot of) self-love.'
  c. Jean heeft ??(veel) zelfkennis (*gehad).
      'Jean has (had) a lot of selfknowledge.'
(44) a. Louis a (eu) beaucoup d'appréciation pour lui-même.
      *?Louis a de l'appréciation pour lui-même.
      'Louis holds/has held himself in (high) esteem'
  b. Mathilde a (*eu) beaucoup d'amour propre.
      *Mathilde a de l'amour propre.
      'Mathilde has (had) (a lot of) self-love.'
  c. Jean a (*eu) une *(bonne) connaissance de soi.
      'Jean has (had) a sound self-knowledge.'

Both syntactically and semantically, then, these inalienable constructions strongly resemble the French sentences (34) through (36): both require adverbial modification of some sort, and both are temporally inert. We therefore want to suggest that the analysis of the French sentences in (34)-(36) should be very close to that of constructions involving inalienable possession. Concretely, *se* in the French sentences in (34)-(36) has exactly the same function as *hebben/avoir* 'have' in inalienable possession constructions such as (43) and (44). The link between HAVE and SE can be established as follows: Kayne (1993) argues that HAVE results from the incorporation of an oblique element into BE; Postma (1993) in turn identifies BE as a SE-morpheme.

      The analogy might be pushed one step further still. In their analysis of a variety of uses of *have*, Déchaine, Hoekstra & Rooryck (1995) propose that the basic configurations distinguishing alienable and inalienable possession in the complement of *have* are as follows, examples being given in (46) and (47), respectively:

(45) a. HAVE DP   permanent/inherent/inalienable
  b. HAVE TP   happenstance/contingent/alienable
(46)   Henry has a big nose.
(47) a. Henry has $5.
  b. Henry has slept too long.
  c. Henry has his hands on his back.

Since constructions of inalienable possession as in (45a) lack a TP projection, the sentences instantiating it are temporally inert.

      This analysis can now be extended to the French stative sentences involving *se* in (34)-(36). We propose that the contrast between alienable and inalienable constructions in (45) finds a parallel in the simplex reflexive construction.

(48) a. Jean se connaît bien.
      'Jean know himself well.'
  b. Sophie s'est lavée.
      'Sophie washed herself.'

'Standard' reflexives as in (48b) involve verbs that possess temporal progression, i.e. are compatible with time-slices. We shall say that they 'activate' T°. By contrast, 'stative' reflexive sentences as in (48a), which we have shown to be temporally and adverbially restricted, involve stative verbs not possessing temporal progression, and not compatible

with time-slices; we shall say that T° is 'inert' in such cases. Schematically, this contrast can be represented as in (49).

(49) a. $[_{TP}$ [SE-T°$_{inert}$]]
      b. $[_{TP}$ [SE-T°$_{active}$]]

The temporally inert configuration in (49a) now corresponds to that of HAVE+DP in (45a), and the temporally active configuration in (49b) to that of HAVE+TP in (45b). The configurations of (45a) and (49a) both trigger effects typical of inalienable possession, such as temporal restrictions and the requirement for adjectival/ adverbial modification.

       Despite the correspondence between both types of constructions, we should be led to wonder how such an analysis is compatible with our earlier characterisation of *se* as a spatio-temporal slice. If *se* is a spatio-temporal slice, how can it appear in a temporally inert T°? We believe that there is no contradiction. When *zich/se* is generated in an 'active' T°, it operates as a temporal slice, hooking up to the simultaneous slice in the set of temporal slices of the sliceable antecedent DP. In that sense, the temporal domain functions as the domain or range for the slicing operation. When *se* is generated in a T° which is temporally inert, it obviously cannot operate as a temporal slice. But there is another possibility: SE may take the spatial domain as the spatial range, i.e. it operates as a spatial slicer over the antecedent. The configuration of inalienable possession offers a domain that enables an individual to be spatially sliceable. As a result, cases such as (48a) exhibit all the properties typical of inalienable constructions.

       The question remains why the Dutch sentences with *zich* in (37), which exactly correspond to the French (34)-(36), are ungrammatical. Our account of the impossibility of Dutch *zich* with stative verbs crucially depends on the idea that the absence of differentiated time-slices in stative predicates makes them incompatible with the time-slicer *zich*. Given our analysis of the French data, the question can be reformulated as follows: why does not Dutch *zich* have access to the configuration of inalienable possession which is available in French? The answer to this question is based on the idea that despite their many similarities, *zich* and *se* crucially differ in one respect. Observe that *se*, in contrast to *zich*, is part of a paradigm; for completeness, we add the case of German, where *sich* is also part of a bimorphemic paradigm:

(50) *French*   *Dutch*   *German*
      se/soi   zich   sich
      me/moi (me/mij)   mich   'me'
      te/toi   (je/jou) dich   'you'
      le/lui   ('m/hem)   (ihn)   'him'
      je   (ik)   ich   'I'

Following Pica (1995), we assume that French *se* is bimorphemic, consisting of a D° *s-* and an N° *-e*, which also occurs in the other elements of the paradigm, while Dutch *zich* is a monomorphemic D°, the *–(i)ch* element not being attested elsewhere. Semantically, the D° *s-* is a possessive element, also found in *son/sa* 'his/her', while the *-e* morpheme and its nonclitic allomorph *-oi* represent an inalienable noun referring to the body (Pica 1995).[10] The morphological structure of the *se* anaphor then is very close to the syntax of *sa personne* 'his/her person' in expressions such as (51):

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[10]   The idea that anaphors originate diachronically as inalienable body parts was first proposed by Faltz (1977), and further developed by Pica (1984, 1985, 1988) and Postma (1995).

(51)   Mathilde est fière de sa personne.
        'Mathilde is proud of her body/herself.'

We can now make the parallel between (48a) and the French sentences of inalienable possession involving abstract body parts in (44) more precise. In the same way the combination of *soi* or *propre* licenses a configuration of inalienable possession with *have* in (44), the presence of *se* in the French sentence (48a) licenses inalienable possession with those specific predicates: both *se/soi* and *propre* are inalienable, triggering the syntax of inalienable possession in temporally inert configurations.

In contrast to French *se/soi* and *propre*, Dutch *zich* 'self' does not contain an inalienable noun, but is simply a D. Therefore, it cannot occur in stative environments involving inalienable possession of the type in (48a) (see (37) above). The reason for this is that the lack of an inalienable noun denies *zich* access to the domain of spatial slicing that is required in temporally inert contexts. The analysis is confirmed by the case of German *sich*, which, according to our analysis, should behave like French *se* and not like Dutch *zich*, as it is part of a paradigm (see (50) above). This expectation is confirmed.[11]

(52) a. Max kennt sich ??(nicht so gut).
         'Max doesn't know himself all that well.'
     b. Frida liebt sich ??(sehr).
         'Frida loves herself a lot.'

Returning to Dutch, the absence of a body part interpretation for *zich* does not mean that other anaphoric elements in Dutch might not contain inalienable nouns. Thus Postma (1997) argues that the Focus-marker *zelf*, also found in the complex anaphor *zichzelf*, diachronically derives from *se* + *lf* 'his body'. Also, in various dialects the A° *eigen* 'own' can function as an anaphor in combination with the possessive *z'n* 'his':

(53)   Jan wast z'n eigen.
        Jan washes his own.
        'John washes himself.'

The inalienable nature of *zelf* 'self' and *eigen* 'own' is confirmed in contexts of inalienable possession. In certain compounds, *zelf* 'self' and *eigen* 'own' make the resulting noun into an inalienable one which requires modification and temporal restrictions, as illustrated in (43).[12] The same is true for the corresponding French sentences, where *propre* 'own' in (44b) and *soi* in (44c) (but not *lui-même* in (44a)) are the elements turning the compound into an inalienable noun. Crucially, Dutch *zich*!can never be used in such compounds, as the following contrasts show.

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[11]   In several other respects as well, German *sich* resembles French *se* more closely than it does Dutch *zich*, such as its potential to act as a reciprocal anaphor, or its occurrence in middles and various types of impersonal constructions. In such cases, *se/sich* can occur with nonsliceable subjects and/or stative verbs.

[12]   Note that the inalienable character of the compound is not just a function of the presence of *zelf*, but rather the result of the combination of *zelf* with certain predicates. Many compounds involving *zelf* do not display inalienable characteristics: *zelfvoldaanheid* 'self-complacency', *zelfgenoegzaamheid* 'self-satisfaction', *zelfmoord* 'suicide'. These cannot occur with *hebben* 'have', e.g. *Max heeft veel zelfvoldaanheid* 'Max has a lot of self-complacency'.

(54)   zelf/*zichrespect   self-respect
          zelf/*zichkennis   self-knowledge
          eigen/*zichliefde   self-love
          eigen/*zichdunk   complacency
          zelf/*zichmoord   suicide

In our view, this is due to the fact that *zich* is only a D°: since it does not contain an N° denoting a body part, it cannot occur as the complement of the verb that is at the basis of the deverbal compound.

6.   Conclusion

We have argued that French possesses a complex anaphor *se … lui-même*, which is a close analogue of Dutch *zichzelf*. Simplex and complex reflexives differ on two counts: (i) simplex reflexives occur in an unaccusative argument frame, whereas complex reflexives are found with transitive verbs, and (ii) simplex anaphors establish a relation of identity between temporal slices of a DP and those of an activity. This accounts for dynamism on the part of the verb, and (at least) 'higher order' inanimacy on the part of the subject. Dutch and French were shown to differ on the property of dynamism where we argued that French possesses the syntactic means to express spatial slicing rather than temporal slicing of the subject. This yields a set of properties reminiscent of constructions of inalienable possession.

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