

Augmented and non-augmented *HAVE*

Rose-Marie Déchaine* / Teun Hoekstra# / Johan Rooryck#

*University of British Columbia/ #HIL - Leiden University

1. Introduction

This paper deals with the variety of uses of the verb *HAVE* in English, Dutch and French. In each of these languages, *HAVE* displays different usages. However, in English, *HAVE* has uses not found in the other two languages. This *HAVE* we shall refer to as augmented *HAVE*, a label that brings out the essential ingredient in the account of the difference between English *HAVE* and its Dutch and French congeners.

We defend the following claims:

a. *HAVE* (both augmented and non-augmented) is “partitive”.

This partitive nature is determined by one of the elements out of which *HAVE* is composed, viz. a reflexive element, represented throughout as *SE*. The presence of this element is responsible for the “anaphorization” requirement imposed on *HAVE*'s complement.

b. The complement of *HAVE* may be DP or TP.

A DP complement correlates with intrinsic possession. A TP complement correlates with contingent possession or happenstance. Moreover, TP complements are a kind of Small Clause, inasmuch as they are not headed by C° , and hence do not allow morphological Tense. We examine the full range of possibilities for the complement structure of abstract TNS.

c. Augmented *HAVE* is the result of incorporating a dynamic P.

In English, the dynamic P is *to*. Lack of such an augment in Dutch and French accounts for the unavailability of the interpretations involving augmented *HAVE*.¹

2. Non-dynamic possessive structures.

2.1. Inherent and non-inherent possession

All *HAVE*-languages appear to feature two distinct types of stative possessive structures: alienable and inalienable. Simple alienable possessive structures are restricted to animate subjects (Belvin 1993), yielding the contrast between (2a) and (2b):

- | | | | |
|-----|----|-------------------------|-------------------|
| (1) | a. | the table has four legs | <i>inherent</i> |
| | b. | John has a big nose | <i>inherent</i> |
| (2) | a. | *the table has a lamp | <i>contingent</i> |
| | b. | John has \$5 | <i>contingent</i> |

This animacy effect disappears in the case of complex complements as in (3c), which we propose to analyze as small clauses (SC).

- | | | | |
|-----|----|----------------------------|-------------------|
| (3) | a. | the table has a lamp on it | <i>contingent</i> |
| | b. | John has \$5 on him | <i>contingent</i> |

To preview, we analyze the complement of *HAVE* in (1) as a DP, and the one in (3) as a Small

¹ The incorporation of this augment is not responsible for the creation of *HAVE* as a form, as one might think on the basis of Kayne's proposal. Rather, the form of *HAVE* is unaffected by this incorporation, just like the form of *GIVE* is unaffected under the incorporation of the same augment in double object constructions. However, we do not deny that the form *HAVE* may result from an incorporation of an oblique element into *BE* (which we take to be our *SE*, following Postma 1993). This oblique element is not the dynamic *to*, but rather a stative preposition.

Clause (specifically, as a TP complement with null Tense). We argue that the well-formedness of (2b) reflects the (independently motivated) availability of animate *pro*.

The patterning of the inalienable possessor structures in (1)-(3) establishes that, in certain environments, there is an animacy effect. One way to capture this effect, more or less in the terms of Belvin (1993), is to say that inalienable possession is inherently internal, but that alienable possession is external and so must be “internalized” via an anaphoric relation with some element contained in the complement of *HAVE*, cf. the pronouns *it* and *him* in (3). Granting this, two questions arise:

- a. What is the source of the “internality” requirement?
- b. In the absence of an overt anaphoric relation, as in (1) and (2b), how is the “internality” requirement satisfied?

In order to answer the first question we follow the hypothesis of Kayne (1992) and others by assuming that *HAVE* results from the incorporation of an oblique element into *BE*. We also follow Postma (1993) who identifies *BE* as a *SE*-morpheme.² We therefore assume the following underlying structure and derivation:

(4) DP_i <nom>SE XP P t_i (SE+P=HAVE)

Relevant to us is the *SE*-part in *HAVE*: its anaphoric nature gives an immediate account of the partitive relationship that exists between the subject of *HAVE* and its complement, as it would for the same partitive relationship that holds for *BE*-constructions (*John is ill* means that *being ill* is among John's properties, just as *John has a big nose* means that the nose is a part of John). The difference between *HAVE* and *BE* resides in the availability of accusative Case in *HAVE* constructions, which requires a Case-dependent DP in the complement. Hoekstra (1993) argues that *HAVE* inherits its Case-licensing potential from the incorporated P.

This analysis of *SE* is fairly close to Kayne's (class lectures) analysis of a simple reflexive *SE*-construction such as *Jean se voit* ‘John SELF-sees’, as in (5):

(5) Jean_i SE_j voit_k [VP PRO_j t_k t_i] i=j

where *Jean* is moved from the object position, *SE* is base-generated in some functional head-position. The external argument is PRO. *SE* is linked to PRO for the same reason as in (6), i.e. in order to be licit vis-à-vis the principle of Full Interpretation (FI). The *i=j* identity comes about through the manner of head-spec agreement in a way which need not concern us at this point.

The *SE*-component of *HAVE*-sentences can be thought of as a partitive operator: it is bound by the subject, but in order to have an interpretation, it must bind a variable in its scope, as required by FI. This analysis thus automatically yields the “internality” requirement, as is clear from (6), where *SE* must bind a pronoun inside XP.

(6) DP_i P+SE_i [XP --- pro_i ---]

The operator status of *SE* is confirmed by examples such as (7), where it binds two pronominal variables at the same time:

- (7) a. John has his hands on his back
- b. John has his money in his pocket

² As is clear from the structure in (4), we slightly depart from Kayne with respect to the site from which the oblique head is incorporated: while in Kayne's proposal, the Dative phrase originates internal to a DP complement of *BE*, we position it external to this complement.

We now turn to the question b., viz. how the “internality” requirement is satisfied. The first step is to recognize that, in principle, a pronominal variable may arise in a number of different ways. The second step is to distinguish simple DP complements from Small Clause complements, each associated with a distinct interpretive effect:

- (8) a. HAVE DP permanent/ inherent
 b. HAVE [SC DP PRED] happenstance/ contingent

In (8a), we are dealing with inalienable possession. The binding requirement is satisfied by an argument of the noun heading the DP. This explains why only relational nouns occur in this position. The binding of an argument position in the NP represents the inherent possession, as in (9):

- (9) John P+SE_i [DP ____ a [NP pro nose pro_i]
 <1,2>

A body part such as *nose* is a relational noun:³ besides its R-argument in the sense of Williams (1981), there is an experiencer argument, represented by pro_i in (9), which acts as a variable bound by *SE*. We are not concerned at this point with the precise internal structure of DP, but the case in (9) may be entirely identical to (5), if the experiencer argument is moved to [Spec,DP], i.e. to the position of *John* in *John's nose*. The actual structure of (9) hence is as in (10). We return to the relevance of this below. The moved Experiencer pro_i now has the status of PRO. We follow Kayne (1991) in the assumption that PRO is a locally bound pronoun. PRO is licit in the given configuration because of the absence of specified D/AGR, parallel to the conditions in infinitival clauses.

- (10) John P+SE_i [DP PRO_i a [NP pro nose t_i]
 <1,2>

Turning now to the Small Clause structure in (8b): it involves a predication, and hence denotes an eventuality, i.e. a state of affairs which is temporally limited. We represent such small clauses not just as projections of lexical categories, but claim that they contain independent functional superstructure, in particular an abstract tense-position (Déchaine 1993). It should be noted that the happenstance or contingent character of these clausal complements is independent of the nature of possession. This is evident from the examples in (7), where (7a) involves two

³ The property of being a relational noun is context-dependent, but nevertheless syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be relational, e.g. *fold* or *part*. Others vacillate. A clear example is *child*, which can be used relationally, or, when in opposition to *adult*, as non-relational. Other cases are more subtle. *Running water* is non-relational in mountaneous areas, but clearly relational in hotel rooms, where it is dependent on an infrastructure. Hence, it is possible to say *This room has running water*, where we are bound to say that *running water* is relational. Yet a further example might be *dog*, which is part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational concept in contexts where dogs, on a par with game, are considered edible. This context-dependency does not take away the syntactic relevance of the distinction. Consider the examples in (i):

- (i) a. Sandy has a child
 b. Sandy has a child on her/his lap

While *child* in (ia) is necessarily relational (i.e. there is a child/parent relation), this is not required in (ib), where the child may or may not be Sandy's. Another example of the relevance of context is given in (ii):

- (ii) a. *This table has a lamp
 b. This table has no lamp

Clearly, (iib) is used in a context in which having a lamp is the expected case for tables: hence, in the given context *lamp* has become relational. (iia) is therefore ungrammatical only under the context in which having a lamp is not the expected case.

inherently possessed body parts and (7b) involves two non-inherently possessed entities, but in either case the happenstance interpretation arises. Specifically, in (7a), the particular relationship between John's hands and John's back is not inherent, but temporally limited. If it were not, then it would denote a state of affairs where John always has his hands on his back.

We now have established how the “internality” requirement is satisfied in cases of inherent possession (via a PRO experiencer), and SC complements (via overt pronouns). Yet to be accounted for is (2b), an instance of non-inherent (contingent) possession, but without an overt pronoun. We now turn to this problem.

2.2. The animacy effect

The ill-formedness of (2a) is predicted by our analysis: *lamp* is not a relational noun (cf. note 3). Hence, it does not provide a pronominal variable for *SE* to bind, and the structure is ruled out by FI on account of *SE* having no interpretation.

What is surprising is the well-formedness of (2b): *dollar* is not a relational noun, and does not provide a pronominal variable for *SE* to bind, leaving *SE* without an appropriate interpretation, violating Full Interpretation. We conclude that something else must be at play in the licensing of (2b). Observe that this is an instance of contingent possession. On independent grounds, we have proposed that contingent possession is to be represented as TP-complementation. These considerations lead us to postulate the structure in (11), with a pronominal variable contained in the complement of T.

(11) John P+SE_i [TP \$_j T [SC t_j ... pro_i]]

Simply introducing an empty pronominal is not sufficient to capture the contrast between (2a) and (2b). We must also ensure that this empty pronominal does NOT get introduced in (2a). Belvin (1993) notes that such cases of what he calls “external possession” are limited to animate subjects. Note that an animacy contrast is found elsewhere, as evidenced in (12)-(13):

- (12) a. There is a hat on the table/*John
 b. John has a hat on (him)
 c. The table has a lamp on *(it)
- (13) a. Ik zet een hoed op de tafel/*Jan
 I put a hat on the table/John
 b. Ik zet Jan/*de tafel een hoed op
 I put John/the table a hat on

These examples show that animates in certain environments (precisely the kinds of environment relevant for these structures) cannot occur in the complement of P. Instead, we find an empty complement, e.g. *John has a hat on*. This option is excluded in the case of inanimate locations, e.g. **The table has a lamp on*. Let us stipulate, therefore, the presence of an animate pro in the system, in (13b) bound by the dative DP *Jan*, and by *SE* in (12b). Going one step further, we now identify the pro postulated in (11)/(2b) with this animate pro, thus reducing the contrast in (2) to those in (12) and (13). However, there remains a difference: in (12) and (13) the animate pro occurs as the complement of an overt P, but in (11)/(2b), no such P is evident. We propose that the relevant P in (11) is the preposition of “central coincidence” of Hale (1986). This preposition is distinct from other prepositions in the language. It is close to the meaning of *with* as in *John has \$5 with him*, and *on* as in *John has \$5 on him*, but nevertheless distinct from them.

We take it to be the hyperonym of *with* and *on*.⁴

The animacy requirement manifests itself in a very subtle manner in the following contrast:

- (14) a. John has his/the window open
 b. The house has its/*the window open

The choice of *his/its* is unproblematic: the pronoun provides a bindable site for *SE*. We make the further assumption that, at least in English, PRO is not allowed in [Spec,DP] if it is headed by *the*.⁵ This correctly rules out (14b) with *the*, but raises the question why (14a) is grammatical with *the*. It can't be the DP *the window* which is satisfying *SE*'s requirement since *the* prevents there being a bindable PRO in [Spec,DP]), so this implies that there must be another available bindable site. This would be the case if the structure of (14a) were as in (15):

- (15) HAVE [TP [the window]_i T [PP [AP t_i open] Pe pro_j]]

where pro_j provides the required pronominal variable, and at the same time accounts for the animacy effect.

The structure in (15) presents a structural option not yet considered, viz. one in which the subject of the small clause is not occupied by DP, but by a clausal constituent, in this instance an AP-small clause. We shall consider these more complex structures below (section 3.3).

3. Dynamic HAVE

In this section we turn to a use of *HAVE* which is limited to English, and which we have dubbed dynamic *HAVE*, in contradistinction to the *HAVE*-structures discussed sofar, which are all stative. Dynamic *HAVE* structures occur in a number of types. They all involve non-inherent (contingent) relationships, and so by hypothesis are to be analyzed as (abstract) TPs.

3.1. Light verb HAVE

Let us start with the simplest case, viz. light verb *HAVE*-constructions:

- (16) a. Mary had a baby
 i) but she doesn't anymore (stative)
 ii) Mary is having a baby (eventive)
 b. Mary had a cup of tea
 i) but she used it all up (stative)
 ii) Mary is having a cup of tea (eventive)
 c. Mary had a shower
 i) but now she has a bathtub (stative)

⁴ The existence of an animate pro can easily be supported with a wide range of phenomena across various languages, e.g. null objects in Portuguese. We do not have the space to elaborate on this point. Further questions arise with respect to a) the range of prepositions allowing this animate pro in their complement (cf. *John saw a snake near him/*pro*), and b) the difference between an overt and a covert pronominal (*John had a coat on pro/him*, cf. *the table had a cloth on *pro/it*). We leave these matters for further research.

⁵ This assumption is compatible with the observation that cases of inherent possession never feature a definite determiner, e.g. **John has the big nose*, **the house has the (beautiful) window*. The nature of the definite determiner in Romance may be different (cf. Vergnaud & Zubizarreta 1992, Tellier 1994). English does feature this use of the definite determiner in prepositional contexts of the type *I hit John on the nose*. We have no insights to offer at this point.

ii) Mary is having a shower (eventive)

These sentences are ambiguous between a stative and a non-stative (eventive) reading. Under the stative reading, the only one available for their Dutch and French counterparts,⁶ they assert that Mary was in the possession of an object, be it a baby, a cup of tea, or a shower. Their stativity is confirmed by the possibility of continuing these examples with (i). On the eventive reading, the examples in (16) assert that at some time in the past, Mary is involved in the activity of “delivering a baby”, “tea-drinking” and “showering”. Their eventivity is confirmed by their compatibility with the progressive, as in (ii).

The systematic ambiguity of light verb *HAVE* between a stative and an eventive interpretation is also seen from tense-effects. Eventive verbs allow simple present only in a quantificational environment, e.g. in the presence of adverbs of quantification such as *often* and *usually*. In this respect, light verb *HAVE* has the interpretive properties of an eventive predicate, as shown in (17a) and (17b). In the absence of a quantificational operator, canonical eventives are interpreted generically (e.g. *Mary sings*, *Mary dances*), while statives are interpreted as holding at the utterance situation (e.g. *Mary likes chocolate*). When light verb *HAVE* occurs without a quantifier, it is ambiguous: on the eventive construal, (17c) is akin to *Mary showers*, and on the stative construal it is akin to *Mary owns a shower*.

- (17) a. Mary often has a shower in the morning
 b. When Mary has a shower, she usually sings
 c. Mary has a shower

It is not the tense effects themselves which determine whether a dynamic meaning is available for *HAVE*. Rather, it is the possibility of light verb *HAVE* being dynamic that yields these tense effects, i.e. the tense effects follow from the dynamism of the predicate. This makes evident that the availability of these dynamic readings in English are independent of potential contributions of the semantics of tense, as it is unlikely that the adverbs of quantification in (17a/b) would contribute the dynamicity of *HAVE* (but cf. note 5). The eventive nature of these dynamic *HAVE*-sentences also explains the range of nouns that allow these structures. An eventive interpretation is available inasmuch as the noun can be associated with a plausible activity. As an activity, “dollaring” is not easily conceivable, so that in (2a) *John has \$5* only has a stative (possessive) interpretation. But “babying”, “tea-drinking” and “showering” are more easily construed as activities, hence the possibility of an eventive interpretation in (16).

We are left with two related questions:

- a. What is the structure of eventive light verb constructions?

⁶ In the perfect tense, Dutch and French also allow such inchoative interpretations, as in (i) and (ii).

- (i) a. Marie heeft een baby gehad
 Marie has a baby had “Mary has delivered a baby”
 b. Van wie heb je dat gehad?
 Of whom have you that had “From whom did you get this?”
 (ii) a. Marie a eu un bébé =(ia)
 b. Il a eu un livre de sa mère
 He has had a book of his mother
 “He has got a book from his mother”

These constructions are qualitatively different from the constructions in English: they are limited to perfect tense, and are also less restricted with respect to the choice of object. The inchoative reading derives from the accomplished interpretation of the participle.

b. What is the source of their eventiveness/dynamism?

As a first step in providing an answer to these questions, note the dynamic character of (18):

(18) John had himself a cup of tea

Observe also that even without the overt presence of *himself* the sentence has a reflexive interpretation. This reflexivity is obligatory, as evidenced by the ill-formedness of (19a). In this respect, the *have*-construction contrasts with *get*, which may be, but need not be, reflexive, as shown in (19b). Consistent with this difference, in the absence of an overt reflexive, the *get*-construction is not necessarily reflexive in its interpretation, as in (19c).

- (19) a. *John had Mary a cup of tea
 b. John got Mary/himself a cup of tea
 c. John got a cup of tea

The basic ingredient of our *HAVE*-analysis is that there must be an anaphoric link between the subject of *HAVE* and an A-position contained in the complement of *HAVE*. Hence, both (16) and (18) must contain a bindable site. As a first approximation, the structure of (18) is as in (20):

(20) HAVE (=P+SE_i) [TP ___ T [XP [DP a cup of tea] ... pro_i ...]]

Let us run through the arguments for this partial representation. First, the relationship between *John* and *a cup of tea* is not inherent. Hence, the complement of *HAVE* must be TP. Second, there must be a pronominal element to satisfy *HAVE*'s binding requirement. This element is *himself* in (18).⁷ We assume that *himself* is generated in the complement of *to* in the predicate position internal to XP. From there it is moved to [Spec,TP] in the manner argued for by den Dikken (1992) for double object constructions. He argues that this is an instance of locative preposing, i.e. predicate preposing by which the DP *a cup of tea*, its subject, receives case. After movement of *to himself* to [Spec,TP] *to* is in a position from where it may be incorporated into *HAVE*. At LF, *himself* is further moved to [Spec,AGROP]. This gives (21a) as the ultimate underlying structure, with its derivation (21b):

- (21) a. HAVE [TP --- T [PP [DP a cup of tea] to himself]]
 b. HAVE+to_i [TP [t_i himself]_j T [PP [DP a cup of tea] t_j]]

We note on the side that given the choice of *himself* movement of (*to*) *himself* is the only option, as otherwise *himself*, being anaphoric, is not locally bound, *a cup of tea* being a local accessible subject. Alternatively, had a pronoun (*him*) been chosen, such movement would have to be precluded in order to avoid a principle B violation. The relation between a pronoun and a reflexive pronoun is thus as that between pro_i in the complement position of *nose* in (9) and PRO in (10).⁸

⁷ Recall that we assume that there are only pronouns, as per Kayne (1991). Hence, *himself* is a pronoun, anaphorized through the addition of the *self*-morpheme, cf. Pica (1987). This anaphorization imposes a more local binding requirement.

⁸ Zribi-Hertz (p.c.) points out the existence of non-dynamic *to* in the complement of *HAVE*, as in (i), which differs in meaning from (ii).

- (i) John had the room to him*(self)/ *Mary
 (ii) John had him*(self)/*Mary a room

Does (i), with a 'stative' *to*, underly 'dynamic' (ii)? Recall that we follow Kayne's assumption that only pronouns exist, with *SELF* attached as an indication of local binding. Underlying (ii), then, we would not predict (i), but rather (iii), parallel to (iv):

- (iii) John had a room to him

Having identified the structure associated with light verb *HAVE*, we now consider the source of its eventiveness. We propose that *HAVE+to* is responsible for the dynamic nature of *HAVE* in these examples. The fact that Dutch and French do not have a dynamic *HAVE* now reduces to the fact that there is no candidate preposition which could yield such a dynamic verb via incorporation. To be sure, the Dutch prepositions *te* and *aan* are stative, not dynamic, as is the French preposition *à*. This difference is easily observable: *A train to London* or *This train is to London* are directional, hence dynamic, whereas *Un train à Paris* or *Le train est à Paris* have a stative reading.⁹ The difference between *aan/à* and *to* is also visible in *De beslissing is aan Jan*, *La décision est à Jean*, where apparently a stative preposition is used. English must stativize *to* in this case, by adding *up*, as in *The decision is *(up) to John*.

3.2. Causative *HAVE*

In addition to the light verb dynamic *HAVE* discussed in the previous section, English *HAVE* has a further dynamic use, which is also absent in Dutch and French, viz. so-called causative *HAVE* (cf. Ritter & Rosen 1991), illustrated in (22).

- (22) a. John had me dance with Sandy
b. John had Bill kissed by the Mafia

Again applying the logic developed so far, we are led to postulate the structure in (23):

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- (iv) John had \$5 on him(*self)

The problem with (i), therefore, is why the pronoun is ‘reflexivized’. The natural assumption is that an invisible local antecedent is present for *himself*, as in (vi):

- (vi) John_i had [SC the room [XP e_i ... to himself_i]]

We are thus led to ask what the nature of XP is. We have as yet no detailed proposal to make, but the idea would be that the internal complexity of XP prohibits incorporation of *to* in this case. The semantic role of *to himself* in (i) is comparable to that of other restrictive predicates, e.g. *John has \$5 to spend*.

⁹ There is a clearly directional preposition in Dutch, viz. *naar*, just as there is *vers* in French. These prepositions appear to have quite different properties from the other prepositions mentioned (*te/aan* and *à*). It can be shown that *naar* in Dutch cannot incorporate into the verb. Firstly, while R-extraction from the complement of P is normally possible in Dutch, with the further condition that the stranded P be (almost) adjacent to the verb (cf. (ib)), such R-extraction is not possible in the case of *naar*: it requires that the adverb *toe* is added, cf. (iic):

- (i) a. Ik ben op het dak geklommen
I am on the roof climbed “I have climbed on the roof”
b. Het dak waar ik op geklommen ben
The roof where I on climbed am
(ii) a. Ik ben naar school gelopen
I am to school walked “I have walked to school”
b. De school waar ik naar *(toe) gelopen ben
The school where I NAAR to walked am

Secondly, while locational prepositions allow for the formation of “postpositional” constructions, as in (iiib), this is excluded with *naar*:

- (iii) a. dat ik in de tuin wandel b. dat ik de tuin in wandel
that I in the garden walk that I the garden in walk
(iv) a. dat ik naar de winkel wandel b. *dat ik de winkel naar wandel
that I NAAR the shop walk that I the shop NAAR walk

This might be taken to constitute independent evidence for the impossibility to incorporate this directional preposition. A parallel fact concerning French *vers* is that whereas various prepositions in various dialects allow for some form of stranding (e.g. *dedans* “inside”, *dessus* “on top”, as well as *J’ai voté pour* “I voted in favor ___”), cf. Zribi-Hertz (1984), no such stranding is ever allowed by *vers*.

(23) HAVE [TP ... T [SC [IP ...V...] [p to] pro]]

The reasoning goes as follows:

- Causative *HAVE* is contingent. By hypothesis, this means that its complement is TP.
- The *SE* component of *HAVE* requires the presence of a pronominal variable, which must be contained in a prepositional predicate
- The prepositional predicate must be headed by *to*, the incorporation of which is responsible for the dynamic character of *HAVE*.

Recall that with light verb *HAVE* it is possible to express the anaphoric relation overtly, by means of a reflexive, as in (18) above. But this is not possible with causative *HAVE*:

(24)a. *John had+to_i [TP [t_i himself]_j T [SC [IP me dance with Sandy] t_j]]

b. *John had+to_i [TP [t_i himself]_j T [SC [IP Bill kissed by the Mafia] t_j]]

An obvious difference between light verb *HAVE* and causative *HAVE* lies in the nature of the lower Small Clause-subject: in (18), it is a simple DP, but in (23) it is an IP. This points to a Case-theoretic account of the contrast. In (18), given the structure in (21), locative preposing of *to himself* allows the DP subject of the SC to share its case with *to himself* (following den Dikken 1992). However, in (24), the case-needy DP is not itself the subject of the SC, but rather it is contained in a larger IP. Therefore, this DP must itself move to [Spec,TP] (and to [Spec,AGROP]) at LF in order to get Case. If locative preposing were to fill these higher Spec's, a Case violation would result. (As before, if locative preposing fails to apply, the reflexive does not have an appropriate antecedent, and the only licit pronominal is animate pro.)

If this account of the ill-formedness of (24) is correct, this implies that (22) does not involve *to* incorporation after movement of *to himself/pro* to [Spec,TP]. But this leaves the following question: given that causative *HAVE* is dynamic, and that dynamic *HAVE* arises via incorporation of *to*, how then can *to* raise to *HAVE* in order to ensure its dynamicity? We propose that this is done by successive head-movement of *to* via T to *HAVE*. This leaves [Spec,TP] as a landing site for the DP subject of the IP. Thus, *to*-incorporation is licensed in one of two ways: via locative preposing as in (21) or via successive head movement. The former is impossible if the subject of the SC is complex, i.e. if the Case needy DP is contained in a larger constituent.

This reasoning also accounts for why there are no sentences of the type **John had me dance with Mary nasty*, with a structure as in (25):

(25) HAVE [TP --- T [SC [IP DP ...] AP]]

Predicate preposing is inapplicable in this instance, because the Case-needy DP is embedded in the subject of SC. This DP must raise to [Spec,TP] at LF in order to be able to reach the available [Spec,AGROP]. If we assume that A is not able to move to T, the option of head movement of A is not available either. The assumption that P may, but A may not move to T is independently justified by i) the absence of tensed adjectives in English, and ii) the presence of prepositional elements in T as with infinitives. In this way, we account for the unavailability of AP-predicates in the complement of (abstract) T in happenstance constructions when the subject is more complex than a DP.

In addition to having bare infinitives as causative complements, we also find participial complements as in (26):

(26) John had Bill examined

The structure of these constructions is essentially that of (23). If participial phrases are a kind of

IP, the absence of a reflexive (**John had himself Bill examined*) is accounted for in the same way: *Bill* has to be able to move to [Spec,TP] to be Case-licensed, and this is incompatible with locative preposing (which is the ultimate source of the reflexive).

At this point, one might ask how (26) differs from a perfect construction, such as (27):

(27) John had examined Bill

(27) does not involve dynamic *HAVE*. Under our assumptions, this means that there is no *to* incorporation. (27) does involve a TP-complement, but in this case, the TP is the participial structure itself. The structure of (27) is as in (29), while that of (26) is as in (28):

(28) HAVE [TP ... T [SC [TP ... T -en [VP pro V Bill]] to pro]]

(29) HAVE [TP ... T -en [VP pro V Bill]]

In (28), the preposition *to* incorporates into *HAVE*, yielding causative *HAVE* (i.e. dynamic *HAVE* with an event denoting complement). The (covert) pronominal complement of *to* satisfies the binding requirement imposed by *SE*, accounting for the “reflexive beneficiary” interpretation. The pronominal external argument of V is not bound by *SE*, but remains free. The object *Bill* raises to the inner [Spec,TP], as is usual in passives, and further raises to the dominating [Spec,TP] at LF in order to be able to reach [Spec,AGROP]. (The same LF movement was posited in connection with (25).

The much simpler construction in (29) instantiates a real T, i.e. a past, which is interpreted as a secondary tense (i.e. Aspect), situating the time of the event denoted by the VP in the past relative to the temporal anchoring point of the tense of *HAVE* (cf. Guéron & Hoekstra 1994). V (or its participial form) raises to T. The binding requirement imposed by *SE* is now satisfied through the external argument *pro*. As in the case of inherent possession (cf. (10)), the argument pronominal bound by *SE* is moved to the position of [Spec,TP], i.e. to a PRO-compatible position. The object *Bill* is moved to the matrix [Spec,AGROP], to satisfy the case provided by *HAVE*. This movement is postponed until LF.

Consistent with our analysis, the interpretations of the structures in (28)-(29) are distinct. (28) has a causative interpretation, with the external argument not bound by *SE* (and hence not bound by the matrix subject). *SE*'s binding requirement is satisfied via the *pro* in the complement of the P head *to*, which is itself incorporated into *HAVE*. (29), on the other hand, is a simple control structure: the external argument of the embedded verb is bound by *SE*, and hence bound by the matrix subject.

3.3. Experiential *HAVE*

In this section we turn to the experiential *HAVE*-construction:

(30) John had a bee sting him on the nose

We analyze it as an instance of non-dynamic *HAVE* with a TP complement, an instance of complex happenstance constructions. In these experiential constructions the binding requirement of *SE* is satisfied overtly by the pronominal element, *him* in this example. Belvin (1993) notes that these experiential constructions are subject to an internal anaphorization requirement in the same way as other cases of contingent possession. The presence of this internal anaphoric link, forced by our analysis of *HAVE*, obviates the need to appeal to any other site for a pronominal variable. The structure of such examples is therefore (31):

(31) John_i HAVE [TP ... T [VP a bee sting him_i on the nose]]

with movement of *sting* to T and *a bee* to [Spec,TP]. That experiential *HAVE*-constructions favor animate subjects reduces to the fact that animates are able of experiencing events as Belvin (1993) notes. Although experiential *HAVE* prefers animate subjects with eventive (verbal) predicates, inanimate subjects are not totally excluded, as evidenced by examples such as *This castle had many visitors pass through its doors*. With non-verbal happenstances (*John's house always has its door open*, *The table has a lamp on it*), animates and inanimates are alike in the option of being in a certain state.

A further observation provides a strong corroboration of some of the assumptions we have made. None of the happenstance structures allow for an overt reflexive subject of the clausal complement. This is illustrated in (32). There is one exception to this general rule, viz. the structure in (32d).

- (32) a. *John had himself sick
 b. *John had himself in the hospital
 c. *John had himself sit on a bee's nest
 d. John had only himself to look after

The problem is similar to that posed by *with*-absolutes, which exhibit the same restriction against reflexive subjects with the same exception:

- (33) a. *with (only) himself ill, John ...
 b. *with (only) himself in the hospital, John
 c. with only himself to look after, John ...

The limitation of *himself* in *with*-constructions to these infinitival predicates suggests a possible venue for the explanation. The infinitival predicate itself contains a gap, bound by an empty operator, which is in turn strongly bound by *himself*. The relevant structure is given in (34):

- (34) [with [SC [only himself]_i [CP O_i [IP PRO_i to look after t_i]]], John_i ...

Suppose that these binding relations establish a (derived) chain, and that the binding requirement on *himself* may be satisfied within this chain, e.g. in the manner of reconstruction or a copy-analysis (cf. Chomsky 1993). For our purposes, we may take *only himself* to also be present at the position of t_i, as a full copy which is not spelled out at PF, and that licensing of *himself* may be satisfied from this position. This licensing involves as per Chomsky (1992), *SELF* movement to INFL, as well as a suitable binder in the Spec of INFL. These requirements are met in the structure in (34), where INFL is present and PRO serves as a local binder.

In other contexts, a *himself* subject of the *with*-construction cannot be licensed under these assumptions: *SELF* movement must be to INFL, the only INFL available is external to the *with*-phrase. As *with*- phrases are adjuncts and hence islands for movement, *SELF* movement is blocked, and the reflexive is therefore illicit.

- (35) *[with [SC [(only) himself] [AP/VP ...]

This approach carries over to our happenstance structures in (32). By hypothesis, happenstance structures are TPs. The structure of (32) is as in (36):

- (36) John HAVE [TP T [SC himself X]]

This T (INFL) provides the local attachment site for *SELF*-movement, thus preventing *SELF*

correlates with a DP complement, headed by a relational noun which provides an experiencer argument that is ultimately licensed as a PRO in [Spec,DP]:

(41) NP_i P+SE_i [DP PRO_i ...]

Contingent possession correlates with a Small Clause complement with a null Tense position. At this point, it is appropriate to present a synopsis of the possibilities. If the Small Clause is headed by the (covert) P of central coincidence, this yields an “external possessor” construction (*John has \$5*) which is restricted to animate subjects. The animacy restriction follows from the presence of animate pro, complement to Pe:

(42) NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC DP [PP Pe pro]]]]

Happenstance *HAVE* is associated with essentially the same structure, except the Small Clause (usually) contains an overt pronominal: (43a) *John had a bee sting him on the nose*, (43b) *The house has its windows open*, and (43c) *The table has a lamp on it*.

(43) a. NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC [VP]]]]

b. NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC [AP]]]]

c. NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC [PP]]]]

The postulation of animate pro also captures the subtle contrasts in (14) that occur with happenstance *HAVE*, and which we analyze as instances where the prepositional Small Clause has in its subject/specifier position something other than a DP, as in (44). This corresponds to examples like *John has the window open*, possible only with animate subjects.

(44) NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC AP [PP Pe pro]]]]

Yet another environment where pro satisfies the binding requirement imposed by the SE-component of *HAVE* is in the perfective, where the subject of the embedded VP is pro (e.g. *John had examined Bill*):

(45) HAVE [TP ... T -en [VP pro V Bill]]

Taken together, (42), (43), (44) and (45) constitute non-augmented *HAVE*.

We furthermore presented an account of the differences in the use of *HAVE* between English on the one hand and Dutch and French on the other. The essential ingredient is the availability of a dynamic preposition in English, whose incorporation into *HAVE* yields augmented *HAVE*. *To*-incorporation arises either through locative preposing of the dative predicate, or through cyclic head-movement of *to*, each correlated with distinct syntactic effects. Locative preposing yields (eventive) light verb *HAVE*, whose bindable site may be a covert animate pro (46a), e.g. *John had a cup of tea*, or an overt reflexive (46b), e.g. *John had himself a cup of tea*.

(46) a. NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC DP [PP to pro_i]]]]

b. NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC DP [PP to himself_i]]]]

Finally, causative *HAVE* arises when the specifier/subject of the Small Clause headed by *to* is an IP (rather than a DP), as in (47). This accounts for not only bare-infinitive complements (*John had me dance with Sandy*), but also for participial complements (*John had Bill examined*).

(47) NP_i P+SE_i [TP [T [SC IP [PP to pro_i]]]]

There is one use of *HAVE* which we have not considered in this paper, viz. the modal *HAVE*-construction. It occurs in all three languages, which suggests that it instantiates non-augmented *HAVE*:

(48) a. John has to do that

b. Jan heeft dat te doen

c. Jean a à faire cela

We shall not try to provide an account of this construction, but want to raise the hypothesis that *HAVE* in this case is complemented by a CP, which makes its status rather distinct from the instances which constitute the focus of our paper.

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Rose-Marie Déchainé	Teun Hoekstra/ Johan Rooryck
Department of Linguistics	Leiden University,
University of British Columbia	P.O. Box 9515,
C-369 - 1866 Main Mall,	2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
Vancouver, B.C. V61 1Z1 Canada	hoekstra@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
dechainé@unixg.ubc.ca	j.e.c.v.rooryck@let.leidenuniv.nl